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COMMENT ON CASES
er's stock. Hence it does not necessarily follow that the stock of
the latter takes an undue burden if denied the right to levy on the
former.
And finally, since the weight of federal authority is contrary"
to the result of the instant case, and the federal courts have juris-
diction of all cases in bankruptcy, the Appellate Court's decision will
probably place California under two rulings, the result of any given
case depending on whether or not the litigant is so situated that he
can prosecute his case in a federal court. This being apparently the
pioneer case on this point in California, it is to be hoped that the
Supreme Court will avoid this result." H. B. H.
INHERITANCE TAXATION: TAX PAYABLE AT DOMICILE OF TES-
IATOR ON INTANGIBLE PERSONALTY IN ANOTHER JURISDICTION--
The universally accepted theory upon which inheritance taxes are
imposed is, that the state, which, if it chooses, may become the suc-
cessor to all the property within its boundaries upon the death of the
owner, exacts an excise for the privilege it confers of succeeding to
property.' A succession to property effected entirely independently
of the authority of a particular state is not taxable by that state.2
However, in the case of intangibles even if the property could have
been distributed independently of the taxing state, if the distributees
have derived any assistance from that state they must pay for it.'
The inclusion of tangible personal property outside the state for
purposes of inheritance taxes violates the due process clause of the
24 See cases, supra, n. 8. The federal jurisdiction covers all cases in
bankruptcy and includes the power of passing on claims. National Bank-
ruptcy Act, 12 (2), 30 U. S. Stats. at L. 545, U. S. Comp. Stats. §§ 9585 ff, I
Fed. Stats. Ann. 521.
1* The following articles and notes give further information on this sub-
ject: Oppenheimer, R. (1924) Rights and Obligations of Customers in
Stockbrokerage Bankruptcies, 37 Harvard Law Review, 860; Smith, E. I.
(1922) Margin Stock, 35 Harvard Law Review, 485; see also 22 Columbia
Law Review, 155, 1 A. L. R. 667.
d "Thus the tax is not upon the property in the ordinary sense of the
word but upon the right to dispose of it, and it is not until it has yielded
its contribution to the state that it becomes the property of the legatee."
United States v. Perkins (1895) 163 U. S. 625, 628, 41 L. Ed. 287, 16 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 1073.
s'Woodruff v. Att'y Gen. 119081 App. Cas. 508, 24 T. L. R. 912; Moore
v. Ruckgaber (1901) 184 U. S. 593, 46 L. Ed. 705, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 521;
Estate of Bowditch (1922) 189 Cal.. 377, 208 Pac. 282; Walker v. Treasurer
(1915) 221 Mass. 600, 109 N. E. 647.
a Keeney v. New York (1911) 222 U. 5. 525, 56 L. Ed. 299, 32 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 105; People v. Union Transit Trust Co. (1912) 255 1ll. 168, 99 N. F. 377.
See notes, 46 L. R. A. (N. 5.) 1179; 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1139.
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Fourteenth Amendment.' Real estate in a foreign jurisdiction is
never subject to an inheritance tax 'at the domicile of the owner."
In applying these principles the Supreme Court of California, in
the case of In re Dillingham's Estate' was confronted with the ques-
tion of the legality of an inheritance tax on shares of stock,T the
corpus of a trust fund, of which testatrix was a beneficiary, in the
hands of a trustee domiciled in another state. The decedent was a
resident of Los Angeles County and her will was admitted to pro-
bate in' that county. The third codicil of the will disposed of the
4 Frick v. Pennsylvania (1925) 69 L. Ed., Adv. Ops. 692, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep.
609. This latest decision of the United States Supreme Court makes uncon-
stitutional many inheritance taxes heretofore approved by several states
including California. Estate of Hughes (1915) 170 Cal. 492, 150 Pac. 344;
Hopkins's Appeal (1905) 77 Conn. 644, 60 Atl. 657; Gallup's Appeal (1904)
76 Conn. 617, 57 Atl. 699. It was contended that inasmuch as Pennsylvania
was not taxing the property but the privilege of succeeding to it, it was
admissible to measure the tax on this privilege by combined value of chattels
within and without the state. In view of the decisions since 1910 which have
rejected this measurement theory with regard to corporation franchise taxes
it is not at all surprising that the theory was likewise rejected in the case
of inheritance taxes. In answer to the contention it was declared, "This
ground in our opinion, is not tenable. It would open the way for doing
indirectly what is forbidden to be done directly, and would render important
constitutional limitations of no avail . . . . Without question each state had
power to tax the transfer of so much of the estate as was under its juris-
diction and also had some discretion in respect of the rate; but none could
use that power and discretion in accomplishing an unconstitutional end, such
as indirectly taxing the transfer of the part of the estate which was under
the exclusive jurisdiction of others." 69 L. Ed., Adv. Ops. 692, 695-6. In
support of this view the opinion cites the corporation tax cases in which
the measurement theory was first rejected. Western Union Telegraph Co. v.
Foster (1917) 247 U. S.105, 62 L. Ed. 1006, 38 Sup. CL Rep. 438, 1 A. L. R.
1278, P. U. R. 1918 D 865; Looney v. Crane Co. (1917) 245 U. S. 178, 62
L. Ed. 230, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 85; International Paper Co. v. Massachusetts
(1917) 246 U. S. 135, 62 L. Ed. 624, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 292, Ann. Cas. 1918 C
617, etc. As to the probable influence of the Frick Case upon California
Inheritance Tax Law see article by Delger Trowbridge, Recent Inheritance
and Estate Tax Decisions, 14 California Law Review, 1.
3 The reason given by the courts is that in the case of foreign realty the
title is transferred by the law of the state wherein the land lies, that the law
of the state of the owner's domicile does not furnish any factor or incident
necessary to the efficacy of the transfer of title, and that the law of one state
cannot control the transfer of land situated in another state. Orr v. Gilman
(1901) 183 U. S. 278, 46 L. Ed. 196, 22 Sup. CtL Rep. 213; Clarke v. Clarke
(1899) 178 U. S. 186, 44 L. Ed. 1028, 20 Sup. CL Rep. 873; Re Swift (1993)
137 N. Y. 77, 32 N. E. 1096, 18 L. R. A. 709.
The real basis of distinction would seem to be indicated in the following:
"Logically there is no reason why, in taxing its residents, the state may not
measure such tax by reference to their realty outside the state, as well as
by any other method. The reason it cannot be done in fact is that such tax-
ation would be so contrary to the settled habits of our government and peoples
as to be a denial of due process of law." Gray, Limitations of Taxing Power,
I 168a.
* (July 30, 1925) 70 Cal. Dec. 139, 238 Pac. 367.
T Under the law as it stands at present at least four different states may
legally tax the inheritance of shares of stock: (1) The state of the decedent
shareholder's domicile. This is upon the basis of the doctrine criticized in
the present note, namely that succession takes place according to the law of
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stock held subject to the trust. It was held that inasmuch as the
transfer was accomplished. by the will which was rendered effective
by the laws of California it was for that reason liable to taxation.
There is no doubt the decision has long practice and authority to
support it. In fact the same decision was reached by the United
States Supreme Court in Bullen v. Wisconsin,' a case in almost
every respect similar to the instant case. Furthermore in the recent
case of Frick v. Pennsylvania,' the Supreme Court expressly ex-
cludes intangibles from the application of its new rule against the
inclusion of tangible personal property outside the state in comput-
ing an inheritance tax at the owner's domicile.o
If succession to real estate and tangible personal property not
in the state of the decedent's domicile cannot there be taxed why
should not foreign intangibles also be exempt? By foreign intangi-
ble is meant a claim which, barring the possibility of the debtor com-
ing into the state, can be realized upon only by going into anothc;
jurisdiction. Why is the law of the testator's domicile needed any
more in the case of succession to intangibles than to tangibles or
realty? In either case is it not the state which controls the beneficial
use of the property that makes the privilege effective rather than the
state of the domicile of the owner? In the case of tangibles it is
the state of physical location which controls the beneficial use, in
the case of intangibles it depends upon whether the intangibles are
the domicile and for the use of that law payment must be given. People v.
Union Trust Co., supra, n. 3; Welch v. Treasurer (1916) 223 Mass. 87, 111
N. E. 774. (2) The state of incorporation. McDougal v. Lilienthal (1917)
174 Cal. 698. 164 Pac. 387; Estate of Bronson (1896) 150 N. Y. 1, 44 N. E.
707; Palmer's Estate (1905) 183 N. Y. 238, 76 N. E. 16. (3) The state where
the certificates of stock are located. New Orleans v. Stempel (1899) 175 U.
S. 309, 44 L. Ed. 174. 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 110. In the case of Wheeler v. Sohmer(1913) 233 U. S. 434, 58 L. Ed. 1030, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 607. an inheritance
tax on notes of non-resident owner kept in the state was declared constitu-
tional although it is doubted if the state could constitutionally levy an
inheritance tax upon title deeds or the evidences of an ordinary contract. (4)
The state where the transfer books are kept. See note 38 Harvard Law
Review. 809, 815.
b (1915) 240 U. S. 625, 60 L. Ed. 830, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 473.
*'Supra. n. 4.
20 The Engliqh courts hold that with regard to personal pronerty inheri-
tance taxes are laid solely according to the principle of domicile, and that
therefore the tax -is not payable in respect of personal property situated in
England belonging to the estate of one who was domiciled out of England.
Wallace v. Att'y Gen. (1865) 1 Ch. 1, 35 L. J., Ch. (N. S.) 124. 13 L. T. (N.
S.) 480; Thomson v. Advocate Gen. (1845) 12 Clark & F. 1, 6 Eng. Rep. R.
816. Furthermore chattels situated out of England at the time of the death
of a non-resident, though subsequently remitted to England are not taxable.
Arnold v. Arnold (1837) 2 Myl. & C. 256. 6 L. J., Ch. (N. S.) 218, 1 Jur. 255;
Logan v. Fairlie (1925) 2 Sim. & Stu. 291, 3 I, J., Ch. 152. "There is however,
an exception to the English rule when the final disposition of the property
of a non-resident is superseded by an English trust, so that the final devolution
of the property at the termination of the trust estate takes place by virtue
of the law of England. and not by the law of the testator's domicil. In such
case, upon the dev-olution of the property at the termination of the trust, it
becomes liable to the succession of duty." 46 L. R. A. (N. 5.) 1167, 1172,
and cases there cited.
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"clothed" or "unclothed". If the intangible is "clothed" there is an
instrument which must be surrendered or accounted for in any suit
to collect the claim. There are thus two states which might control
the beneficial use of the property: (1) the state where the instru-
ment is, (2) the state where the debtor is."' If the intangible is
"unclothed" an instrument is not necessary in a suit to collect and
the state where the debtor is controls the beneficial use of the
property. The law of the domicile is inapplicable save as the state of
"control" expressly or tacitly adopts it, its bearing then being attrib-
utable to such adoption and not to any force of its own." The
taxation of succession to property is lawful only when the law of
the taxing state forms a necessary incident of the succession. If
the property can be transferred without the assistance of the laws
of the taxing state, and if no prohibition of that state could prevent
the succession then there is no just basis for an inheritance tax by
that state. Suppose that in the present case the laws of Wisconsin
do not permit the stock to be obtained by the legatees designated by
the will who would however take under California laws. Is not
California helpless unless Wisconsin chooses to follow California
law of succession in this matter? Or on the other hand suppose
that California law forbids the legatees to take, is there anything t3
prevent Wisconsin from giving them the stock notwithstanding the
contrary law of California? In the last analysis it is the state which
controls the beneficial use of the property that controls the succes-
sion and the law of the decedent's domicile is applied merely for the
sake of convenience. This is in effect recognized in California for
here the general rule that personalty in a foreign state passes by the
law of the decedent's domicile and is therefore subject to an inher-
itance tax at the domicile is held subject to the limitation that there
be no rule to the contrary in the state where the personalty is actually
situated."
It has been argued further that by reason of the fiction mobilia
sequuntur personam personal property has its situs at the domicile
of the owner. The courts have declared several times that this
maxim should only be resorted to when convenience and justice
demand it," as expressed by Mr. Justice Holmes and oft times re-
peated since then, "When logic and the policy of a State conflict
" It might he contended that if the creditor has property in the state
where he lives that state might tax his foreign held intangibles by refusing to
allow him to enjoy the property within its borders until he paid the tax on the
foreign held property. This would be clearly invalid with regard to a tax
on foreign held realty and tangible personalty and should for the same
reasons be invalid with regard to intangibles. See supra, n. 5.
1 Tilt v. Kelsey (1907) 207 U. S. 43. 52 L. Ed. 95, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1;
Blackstone v. Miller (1902) 188 U. S. 189, 204, 47 L. Ed. 439, 23 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 277; Eidman v. Martinez (1901) 184 U. S. 578, 46 L. Ed. 697, 22 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 515; Hilton v. Guyot (1895) 159 U. S. 113, 40 L. Ed. 95, 16 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 139.a2 Re Hodges (1915) 170 Cal. 492. 499. 150 Pac. 344. L. R. A. 1916 A 837.
" Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Orleans (1911) 221 U. 5. 346. 55 L. Ed. 762. 31
Sup. Ct. Rep. 550; Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. v. New Orleans (1906) 205 U. S.
395, 51 L. Ed. 853, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 499.
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with a fiction due to historical tradition, the fiction must give way"."
The fiction remains a fiction whether applied to tangibles or intan-
gibles. There is apparently no reason that can be urged in support
of an inheritance tax at the testator's domicile on intangibles that
could not be just as well employed to justify such a tax upon extra-
territorial tangibles. If the tax is invalid with regard to the latter
it is difficult to see how it is valid in the case of the former. It is
urged that due to the nature of intangibles they will escape taxation
if not taxed at the owner's domicile. That cannot be the real reason
for even when an inheritance tax is imposed by the state where the
property is, and there is thus no doubt that there can be no escape
from a succession tax, an additional tax is none the less levied at
the testator's domicile.1  It is submitted that as in the case of realty
and tangible personal property the state which controls the beneficial
use of the intangibles should be the only one having jurisdiction
to levy an inheritance tax. If the inheritance tax is upon the privilege
of succession then the determining consideration is whether the
beneficiary came into possession of the property by virtue of the
laws of the taxing state. If he did not the tax should not be sus-
tained. All courts lament about the undesirability of double tax-
ation. Indeed, in the last analysis it is this aversion to double
taxation that lies at the basis of the decision holding unconstitutional
property taxation and inheritance taxation upon foreign tangible
property at the domicile of the owner. Double taxation is just as
obnoxious levied upon intangibles as it is if levied upon tangibles.
In either case the same economic interest ultimately bears the burdenA.
Neither abstract and theoretical notions on the one hand nor out-
grown historical fictions on the other should stand in the way of
necessary and beneficial results universally desired.
R. J. T.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS: LIABILITY FOR TORTS: MAINTE-
NANCE OF A GARAGE AS PROPRIETARY FuNcrTION-In discussing the
liability of a municipal corporation for injuries resulting from the
negligence of its agents in performing their duties, it has become the
universal procedure of bench and bar to distinguish between those
functions of a city which are governmental or public in nature and
those functions which are proprietary or private.' The principle,
simply stated, is that a municipality is not liable in a private action
*Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189, 206.
1s'Bullen v. Wisconsin, supra, n. & A property tax on intangibles at
domicile was also upheld even though taxed at situs in Fidelity & Columbia
Trust Co. v. Louisville (1917) 245 U. S. 54,62 L. Ed. 145, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 40.
See Thomas Reed Powell, Extra-territorial Inheritance Taxation, 20 Columbia
Law Review, 1, 280, 303. *
'This principle was first stated in Russell v. Men of Devon (1798) 2
Term Rep. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. R. 359. At common law no action on the
case was permitted to a private individual against the city, the proper rem-
edy being by indictment. Bro. Abr., Accion sur le case, pl. 93; Qusod nato per
Hedon (1404) 5 Edw. IV, 3.
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